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Abstract 
 In their 1963 classic Scarcity and Growth Howard Barnett and Chandler Morse argued that 
resource scarcity did not threaten economic growth. A second investigation in the late 1970s, Scarcity and 
Growth Reconsidered, reached largely the same conclusion. The 25 years since that work was published 
have witnessed many developments. The message of Scarcity and Growth that depletion of market 
resources was not a problem has given way to a concern that “new scarcities” of environmental quality, 
global climate, and biological diversity are emerging. Resources for the Future recently assembled a 
distinguished group of international scholars to again address scarcity and growth. This paper describes 
their charge and summarizes their findings. Technological progress may hold the key to overcoming the 
scarcity of environmental resources. Market forces may not be enough to motivate the required 
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 Scarcity and Growth in the New Millennium: 
Summary 
R. David Simpson, Michael A. Toman, and Robert U. Ayres ∗ 
Introduction 
One of the most famous and influential books ever published on resources and the human 
prospect appeared in 1963. In Scarcity and Growth, Howard J. Barnett and Chandler Morse 
interpreted the extensive data assembled by their colleagues Neal Potter and T. Francis Christy, 
Jr., in another seminal work, Trends in Natural Resource Commodities (1962). From those data 
Barnett and Morse made a compelling case that scarcity of the resources to which they devoted 
most of their attention did not yet, probably would not soon, and conceivably might not ever halt 
economic growth. 
The interplay between scarcity and growth is an issue of perennial concern, however. 
Only a decade after Barnett and Morse published their work, pundits, politicians, and activists 
announced the arrival of an “energy crisis.” Consumers accustomed to decades of the declining 
resource prices Barnett and Morse had documented found themselves waiting in long lines and 
paying skyrocketing prices to purchase gasoline. Academic researchers dusted off the writings of 
scholars such as Harold Hotelling (1931) and M. King Hubbert (1949), looking for insights into 
the causes and implications of rediscovered scarcities. 
At roughly the same time, other types of scarcity were being recognized. Concern was 
growing over resources for which Barnet and Morse could not present data on prices and 
quantities. For much of human history, air, water, and land were employed for waste disposal 
with little thought for the consequences. When people were few and unspoiled lands plentiful, 
the consequences of waste were manageable. As these circumstances changed, however, the 
consequences of pollution mounted. A human population that stood at less than a billion in 1800 
had climbed to 2.5 billion by 1950. By the 1970s some commentators were making apocalyptic 
                                                 
∗R. David Simpson is Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, and 2003–2004, Visiting 
Professor, Department of Economics, University College, London; Michael A. Toman is adjunct faculty member, 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and former Senior Fellow, Resource for the Future. Robert U. Ayres is 
Professor Emeritus, INSEAD. 
1 Resources for the Future  Simpson, Toman, Ayres 
projections for continued growth to be followed shortly by catastrophic decline (Ehrlich 1968). 
Humanity found itself increasingly unable to avoid the consequences of living with its own  
refuse. As Kenneth Boulding put it, the cowboy economy was becoming a spaceship economy 
(Boulding 1966).  
Modern refuse was a more potent witch’s brew than our ancestors were capable of 
producing. The concentrated wastes of humans and their animals have always been a breeding 
ground for disease, and packing ever-larger populations into cities compounded these risks. With 
the Industrial Revolution, however, new poisons came into broader circulation. Smoke from the 
coal burned in her “dark Satanic mills” stained “England’s green and pleasant land.”  Another 
fossil fuel, petroleum, caused further problems. From Los Angeles to Athens to Tokyo, cities 
were increasingly smothered by the exhaust of their motor vehicles. Paper, metalworking, 
chemical, and other industries fouled air, water, and land. 
So in addition to being the occasion of renewed concern regarding the scarcity of energy 
resources, the early 1970s also saw some of the first broad manifestations of concern with what 
we will call in this volume the New Scarcity: the limitations on the environment’s capacity to 
absorb and neutralize the unprecedented waste streams of humanity. From celebration of the first 
Earth Day on April 22, 1970, to the first United Nations Conference on the Environment in 
Stockholm in 1972, to the enactment of broad-reaching environmental protection acts in many 
nations, citizens expressed their concerns over environmental degradation, and governments 
responded. 
Scholars also weighed in. The Club of Rome’s controversial 1972 volume Limits to 
Growth predicted that such limits were fast approaching and that global society ignored them at 
our collective peril (Meadows et al. 1972). Others were quick to fault the analysis in Limits to 
Growth (e.g., Nordhaus 1974). New scholarship appeared on the economics and management of 
natural resources (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal 1974, 1979; Solow 1974; Stiglitz 1974; Clark 1976). 
In fall 1976 Resources for the Future held a conference to again investigate the topic of 
scarcity and growth. In many respects Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered (Smith 1979), the 
volume of collected papers and commentaries from that conference, echoes the optimism of its 
predecessor. That optimism had been buffeted somewhat by the events of the 1970s, however. 
Moreover, as one might expect from a volume combining the contributions of a dozen authors, 
Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered had a less synoptic perspective than its predecessor. Not only 
did some contributors raise doubts as to whether Barnett and Morse’s relatively rosy perspective 
was justified, several also raised concerns regarding the limitations of received economic theory 
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as a tool for analyzing scarcity and growth. And it must be said, Scarcity and Growth 
Reconsidered evidences some groping on the part of the practitioners and innovators of received 
theory to determine what their models could, in fact, say on the topic. Several of its chapters 
focused on determining what it was that available data could tell us about scarcity and growth, 
rather than on making pronouncements regarding long-term prospects from such data.  
More than a quarter of a century has now passed since the chapters constituting Scarcity 
and Growth Reconsidered were collected. New modes of analysis have been developed in many 
disciplines. New empirical understandings have come to the fore. New questions have arisen. 
Even if we are no closer to a final resolution of questions of scarcity and growth, we are in a 
position both to bring new tools and facts to bear on them and to consider nuances that must now 
be addressed in answering them. 
To investigate these issues, Resources for the Future, with generous assistance from the 
Vera I. Heinz Endowment, the Netherlands’ Ministry of the Environment, and the European 
Commission, again assembled a panel of distinguished economists, natural scientists, and others 
to discuss scarcity and growth. On November 18–19, 2002, authors presented their draft papers 
and discussed them with other participants. Following these discussions the authors revised their 
contributions extensively.  
Before reviewing these contributions, however, let us briefly discuss further the 
background and motivation for this undertaking. 
Scarcity and Growth: The Long View 
Before detailing our reasons for again revisiting a classic, we might first take inspiration 
from it and give the reader a broad overview of the issues, both historical and current, motivating 
continuing interest in scarcity and growth. Barnett and Morse displayed a genuine erudition that 
is sadly absent from much of what the economics profession produces today. Many readers 
remember Scarcity and Growth for its extensive quantitative and diagrammatic analyses. 
However, its first 100-odd pages are dedicated to an extensive, authoritative, fascinating, and in 
contrast to much that has been written on the subject in the years since, refreshingly jargon- and 
mathematics-free account of what great thinkers of earlier eras and many disciplines had to say 
about scarcity and its implications for continuing human well-being. Thus, when Barnett and 
Morse proceeded to present their quantitative analysis in the last two-thirds of Scarcity and 
Growth, the reader had been afforded a very complete introduction to the topic. 
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We cannot duplicate Barnett and Morse’s introduction. We commend Barnett and Morse 
to the reader both for their careful scholarship and as an introduction to the perennial questions 
that remain as relevant as they were in the year Scarcity and Growth was published. We will 
also, however, in the space of the few pages available now for the purpose, attempt both to 
radically condense and to slightly update their introduction for readers of this volume.1 
Perhaps the single most important point the original Scarcity and Growth established is 
that world views have changed remarkably in the past two centuries, particularly among 
economists. Thomas Carlyle bestowed on economics the sobriquet “the dismal science” in 
response to the writings of classical economists.2 It is ironic that, some 200 years later, 
economists have come to be seen by some as Panglossian apologists for business-as-usual 
scenarios in which the invisible hand of the market will solve all problems: some early 
economists argued that our problems were insoluble. 
There have, of course, always been both optimists and pessimists. Quintus Tertillianus, 
writing in A.D. 200, was surely not the first to suppose that the world was in decline. “We are 
burdensome to the world,” he wrote. “The resources are scarcely adequate to us…Truly, 
pestilence and hunger and war and flood must be consider[ed] as a remedy for nations, like a 
pruning back of the human race” (quoted in Johnson 2000).3  
Others, of course, had rosier perspectives—and such perspectives could claim an 
even more ancient pedigree. God himself might be supposed to have been a resource 
optimist, if one credits the Old Testament account of his directives. He created man in his 
image, to have “dominion over . . . all the earth… and over every living thing that moveth 
upon the earth” (Genesis 1:26, 28). The Almighty did not seem worried about the 
limitations of the earth’s resources when he promised that the descendants of Abraham 
                                                 
1 The scale of our debt to Barnett and Morse in preparing this introduction is reflected in part by the fact that most of 
the passages quoted from famous economists in this section are taken from Scarcity and Growth. 
2 Somewhat surprisingly, given the widespread belief in the contrary notion, Carlyle was commenting on the racial 
views of John Stuart Mill, rather than Thomas Malthus’s theory of population, when he wrote the remark. See Dixon 
(2002) and Levy and Peart (2003). 
3 D. Gale Johnson (2000) notes that Quintus “includes nearly all the modern complaints about the environmental 
effects of excessive population on environment—deforestation, loss of biological diversity, farming unsuitable land, 
drainage of the natural refuges for wildlife—as well as the massing of people in cities.” 
Joel Cohen (1996) provides an illuminating review of perspectives on the perils of overpopulation from Assyrian 
times to the present. 
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would proliferate “as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea shore” 
(Genesis 22:17).4 
Even if one were not entirely comfortable relying on divine Providence to improve the lot 
of humanity, the notion that human ingenuity would save the day also has a long history. 
Condorcet wrote in 1795 (1955) that  
…nature has set no term to the perfection of human faculties; …the 
perfectibility of man is truly indefinite; …the progress of this perfectibility, from 
now onwards independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other 
limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast us.  
Yet a very different view of the human prospect dominated many writings of the classical 
economists of the era. In his 1798 Essay on the Principle of Population, the British economist 
and cleric Thomas Malthus advanced his well-known theory that population tends to increase 
geometrically while food production can be expected to grow, at best, arithmetically. As a 
consequence, humanity tends inexorably to approach what came to be dubbed, almost two 
centuries later, the limits to growth, often with catastrophic consequences. 
The early economists were a dismal bunch.5 Even Adam Smith, the founder of the 
modern discipline, opined, “Every species of animals naturally multiplies to the means of their 
subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it.” Malthus’s contemporary David Ricardo 
is remembered for his theory of rent. Resources are in short supply, and those lands favored by 
location or other attributes command high prices (“rents”) and are quickly appropriated and 
exploited. This leaves latecomers on the economic scene with meager pickings from which to 
choose. As Robert Heilbroner remarked, “Anyone who was not sufficiently depressed by 
Malthus had only to turn to David Ricardo” (1967, 86). 
Ironically, one of the fundamental insights of economic analysis led the classical 
economists to their misguided or—to give them the greatest benefit of the doubt and to suppose 
with today’s pessimists that the case is not yet closed—premature dismal pronouncement. The 
principle of diminishing returns explains a tremendous amount in economics. The more there is 
                                                 
4 We do not mean to suggest that Christian theology—of indeed, any religion—promotes profligate growth or 
resource use. Many modern theologians interpret the injunction to “have dominion” as to be good stewards of 
resource rather than to waste them (see, e. g., Daly and Cobb 1989). 
5 It is interesting to note, in fact, that Darwin credited Malthus with the fundamental insight motivating his theory of 
evolution. The scarcity of resources leads to the survival of the fittest. 
  5Resources for the Future  Simpson, Toman, Ayres 
of something, the less productive is still more of it. If natural resources are limited, we can 
expand the human workforce and manufactured capital employed in combination with them. 
Without more resources, though, our gains from employing more of other factors of production 
will be progressively smaller. It is the principle of diminishing returns that underlies the use of 
marginal analysis in economics, and it is marginal analysis that resolved the greatest puzzle in 
economics: the paradox of value. Why are some things, like water, both so useful and so cheap 
relative to things like diamonds, which are neither? Because of diminishing returns. In most 
times and places there is so much water relative to diamonds that a little more water is of little 
incremental, or marginal, value. 
The principle of diminishing returns is, then, central in economics. Yet its straightforward 
implication is that economies relying on fixed stocks of land and other resources are, at best, 
destined for stagnation. At worst, population growth in combination with profligate resource use 
and a lack of foresight spells doom for the majority of mankind. 
Many believed that. The great figures of early economics were often inaccurate 
prognosticators. William Stanley Jevons, who first formalized marginal analysis, is famous for 
his predictions concerning the calamities that awaited when coal was exhausted. His dire 
predictions now have a faintly comic tone; among other things, Jevons stockpiled reams of 
writing paper in anticipation of its eventual shortage.  
The following might have been written by a modern conservationist: 
The world is really a very small place, and there is not room in it for the 
opening up of rich new resources during many decades at as rapid a rate as has 
prevailed during the last three or four. When new countries begin to need most of 
their own food and other raw produce, improvements in transport will count for 
little.  
That quote is not taken from any consensus report of the recently concluded World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. It was, rather, the opinion of Alfred Marshall,6 among the 
most important economists of a century ago. 
Marshall did, however, also point the way out of the resource-constrained cul-de-sac. He 
went on to write that “the Law of Diminishing Returns can be opposed only by further 
                                                 
6 Memorials of Alfred Marshall, A.C. Pigou, ed. (1925), p. 326, as cited in A.J. Youngson, Possibilities of Economic 
Progress (London: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 33. 
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improvements in production; and improvements in production must themselves gradually show a 
diminishing return.” Marshall was adopting the wisdom expounded by John Stuart Mill, the 
greatest economist between his generation and that of Malthus and Ricardo. Mill amended 
Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo by noting that the law of diminishing returns might “be suspended, 
or temporarily controlled, by whatever adds to the general power of mankind over nature; and 
especially by any extension of their knowledge.”  
Subsequent generations have yet to determine whether the implications of diminishing 
returns have actually been “suspended” or merely “temporarily controlled” by the “extension of 
knowledge.” As economics evolved, however, statistical evidence seemed to show that 
knowledge was accumulating at an impressive rate (we will discuss a little later whether the 
evidence does in fact show this). Robert Solow, one of the leading economists of the post–World 
War II generation, is associated with the “residual,” to which his name is often attached. The 
Solow residual is the share of output growth that cannot be explained by an increase in the use  
of inputs.  
The gross domestic product of the United States grew at an average annual rate of some 
3.4% between 1950 and 2000. We can decompose the growth of output from one year to the next 
as follows. It is the rate at which output grows in response to increases in labor hours times the 
change in labor hours, plus the rate at which output changes with changes in equipment used 
times the change in equipment used, and so forth, for all inputs. Economic theory holds that the 
rate at which output changes with changes in the quantity of an input is proportional to the price 
of that input. We can, then, decompose changes in output into constituent elements: the change 
in output due to change in labor plus the change due to change in capital equipment, and so on, 
weighting each by its price. Solow noted that these changes fall short of adding up. There is a 
residual, something left over—a difference between observed rates of overall growth and 
measurable changes due to changes in input use. In the decomposition we have just described, 
there is a missing term for the rate at which output changes with changes in unmeasured inputs 
times the proportional change in unmeasured inputs. This residual, commonly called multifactor 
productivity growth, averaged about 1.2% per year between 1950 and 2000. 
The reason the residual is missing from the calculation we have described above is, of 
course, that it cannot be measured. In Moses Abramowitz’s (1956) memorable phrase, the 
residual is “A measure of our ignorance.” It is, by definition, what’s left over when the effects of 
all measurable explanatory variables have been calculated. Despite this fundamental uncertainty, 
the productivity residual is often interpreted as the effect of technological progress. To 
foreshadow an issue we will discuss below, however, we should note other possibilities. The 
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missing input the residual represents could also be an increase in the unmeasured consumption of 
resources that are not traded in markets, a category in which we might also include degradation 
of the environment.  
One of the editors (RUA) has recently put forward another hypothesis. The observed 
growth in productivity might be explained by historical increases in the efficiency with which 
one particular input is used. That input is available energy (or more concisely, “exergy”). The 
efficiency with which raw resources are converted into what physicists call “useful work” has 
improved markedly over the past few centuries. This finding is entirely consistent with the 
results derived by Barnett and Morse and later optimistic authors. If, however, progress is tied to 
the consumption of particular resources rather than being “disembodied,” the scarcity of such 
resources would constrain growth. Moreover, as may now be a more realistic concern, if other 
scarcities associated with the consumption of such resources (we have in mind here primarily 
global climate changed induced by anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions) are more 
constraining that is the physical availability of the resource per se, growth would be limited. 
What does productivity growth mean? If we take the rosy view that it can be extrapolated 
into the indefinite future, it means that we have little to worry about. Recent work by Martin 
Weitzman (1997) suggests that, if we assume that productivity growth will continue at its 
historical level ad infinitum, conventionally measured national income understates true  
welfare by as much as 40%. A more nuanced interpretation might arise if technological progress 
were tied with the use of particular resources that were in short supply or occasioned 
unacceptable environmental consequences. If we take the view that the residual reflects 
profligate waste of unmeasured resources, productivity growth would represent an ominously 
mounting account payable.7  
The optimistic view has dominated the economics profession in recent decades. The 
dismal science has reversed direction since the dire predictions of Malthus and many who 
followed him through at least the early years of the past century. Diminishing returns remain a 
fundamental element of the economics canon, but many believe that their long-run implications 
                                                 
7 We should note some logical limitations on this pessimistic view, however. To suppose that measured productivity 
growth is predicated on deterioration of natural resources would require that such deterioration continued year after 
year. After a certain point it would be implausible to maintain that degradation was fueling productivity, as a 
sufficiently long stretch of productivity growth would have to mean that the resources in question were fully 
depleted. 
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have been more than offset by an equally fundamental element. Majority opinion is that over 
substitution possibilities obviate resource scarcity, with solutions to what some might see as 
long-term resource constraints arising in surprisingly short spans of time. Diminishing returns 
still provide reasonably robust explanations of many microeconomic phenomena (e.g., why 
demand curves slope down). Over any appreciable sweep of time, though, optimists believe that 
the implications of the scarcity of any particular resource are obviated by the abundance of 
potential substitutes, an abundance that grows as technology evolves. 
In writing the original Scarcity and Growth, Harold Barnett and Chandler Morse  
noted that among the classical economists “the doctrine of diminishing returns per capita became 
embedded in economic theory as a self-evident fact, requiring neither precise formulation  
nor analytical investigation” (1963, 51). The tables may have turned in the modern era. Some 
regard the fact that dire predictions have not come true as almost a proof by induction that they 
never will.  
One reason the classical economists’ emphasis on diminishing returns may have been 
misplaced is found in the passage quoted from Alfred Marshall above. He asserted that 
“improvements in production must themselves gradually show a diminishing return.” On this 
point he is explicitly contradicted by J.M. Clark (1923), whose remark is more often quoted: 
“Knowledge is the only instrument of production not subject to diminishing returns.”  
It is difficult to verify Clark’s assertion in the absence of an operational measure of a 
notion as intangible as knowledge.8 Knowledge is, however, different from most other economic 
goods in one important respect. It is nonrival. There is no physical reason why my possession of 
certain knowledge precludes your use of the same knowledge (there may, however, be legal 
reasons, since intellectual property law governs patents, copyrights, and the like). In this respect, 
we see an interesting parallel between knowledge—often touted as the ultimate solution to 
problems of scarcity—and the New Scarcity that provides much of our motivation for again 
revisiting Scarcity and Growth. Environmental pollution and the depletion of global ecological 
assets are also nonrival. The same smoke that makes my eyes water and lungs burn will have a 
similar effect on you, and the accumulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide and diminution of 
global biodiversity may affect people all over the world. 
                                                 
8 This is not impossible. Many modern approaches to economic growth theory have employed the Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) model of differentiated products. If knowledge is defined as “the number of products we know how to 
make,” then there can, in fact, be increasing returns to scale in knowledge. 
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Markets do not allocate nonrival goods efficiently. Too little knowledge is likely to be 
produced, as innovators often generate spillovers that others can appropriate and from which 
they can benefit.9 Too much pollution is likely to be produced as polluters generate wastes that 
spill over into the public domain. One might say, then, that the ultimate resolution of scarcity and 
growth depends on the resolution of two policy issues. First, can we as a global society do 
enough to restrict the negative spillovers we impose on ourselves through pollution? Second, can 
we do enough to promote innovation that generates positive spillovers through the augmentation 
of knowledge, given diminishing returns over time to any particular channel of innovation?  
Scarcity and Growth Today 
There are now—as there no doubt always will be—differing opinions concerning the 
adequacy of resources for a growing population seeking a higher standard of living. A generation 
ago, Silent Spring (Carson 1964), The Population Bomb (Ehrlich 1968), and Limits to Growth 
(Meadows and Meadows 1972) announced the dangers of pesticides, overpopulation, and 
resource depletion, respectively. Such works have been succeeded by tomes detailing evidence 
of climate change (IPCC 2001) and biodiversity loss (Wilson 1992). And just as the late Julian 
Simon disputed the pessimism of earlier writers, commentators such as Gregg Easterbrook in A 
Moment on the Earth (1995) and Bjorn Lomborg in The Skeptical Environmentalist (2000) have 
argued that things are not so bad, and are arguably getting better (many contributors to this 
volume tend to the more pessimistic view).  
If there is a trend to be noted in the debate between optimists and pessimists, it is not so 
much that one or the other is prevailing as that the terms of the discourse are deteriorating. Titles 
tell a great deal: Paul and Anne Ehrlich called their broadside against “brownlashers” who 
downplay environmental concerns The Betrayal of Science and Reason (1996). On the other side 
of the issue, Ronald Bailey titled his own contribution to the debate Ecoscam: The False 
Prophets of Ecological Apocalypse (1994).  
Still, for all the vitriol loosed in recent debates among the optimists and the pessimists, it 
is difficult to say from a review of the evidence whether our generation might be more or less 
                                                 
9 It is, however, possible that a common-pool effect can end in the opposite result. If one innovator’s product can 
supersede or obviate another’s, one rival’s investments in innovation can be stranded by another’s success. If the 
successful innovator does not take account of this effect, she may devote too much effort to producing new and 
better products. 
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concerned than were its predecessors concerning the state of the planet we inherited from our 
parents and will pass along to our children. While recognizing, with Oscar Wilde, that one might 
be accused of knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing, let us begin by reporting 
economic statistics. It has been estimated that the aggregate value of global economic production 
was something less than $700 billion in current dollars in 1800. It had increased to about $2.5 
trillion a century later, $5.3 trillion in 1950, and was nearing $35 trillion at the turn of the new 
century (Maddison 2002).  
One would, of course, want to know something about how these figures translate into per 
capita terms before making any judgments concerning what they say about the human prospect. 
World population has also increased at a dizzying pace. It was not until the early 19th century 
that population reached 1 billion, and not until after World War I, nearly 120 years later, that it 
passed 2 billion. Since then, during the space of a single, not exceptionally long lifetime, world 
population has tripled.  
Economic performance has, however, kept pace with this explosive growth and has itself 
increased at an increasing rate. On average, each of the billion people on the planet two centuries 
ago got by on an income that, estimated as best we now can, totaled between $600 and $700 per 
year in today’s dollars. By 1900 this had increased to well over $1,000 a year. It exceeded 
$2,000 per year in 1950 and now stands at nearly $6,000 per year.  
It is, of course, extraordinarily difficult to translate into contemporary dollars the income 
of someone who lived without electric lights, motorized transportation, even the most 
rudimentary of medical treatment, or any of the host of other conveniences many of us have 
come to regard as necessities. A measure of per capita income is intended to convey some notion 
of the standard of living a person can afford, and it is difficult to make a comparison between 
such different consumption possibilities as those our ancestors faced and our own.  
Several authors have suggested a compelling thought experiment, however. It 
demonstrates that the pace of economic development has (on average, it is important to point 
out) accelerated markedly in recent decades. Although many of the same problems of 
measurement bedevil comparisons over shorter time periods, we might have more confidence in 
saying that average per capita income has roughly tripled in the past 50 years. Extrapolate that 
rate of growth back 2,000 years and one arrives at a per capita income of far less than a penny 
($6,000/3
40 = 5 × 10
–16!). Even allowing for huge problems of measurement, a human being 
simply could not survive on so little. The fact that humans did survive the poverty of our race’s 
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first thousand millennia establishes that the pace of economic progress has increased 
dramatically. 
Let us return to the population growth figures for a moment. Extrapolation of growth at 
the rates of the past half-century quickly leads to surreal results. If population were to continue 
growing at 1.5% per year for another two millennia, the human population would weigh more 
than does the earth itself! This would, of course, be a physical impossibility. Demographers and 
others have long recognized that continuing faster-than-exponential growth would sooner or 
later—but probably “sooner”—lead to a catastrophic collapse. There can be no serious dispute of 
this conclusion. What reasonable people may disagree upon, however, is the point at which 
collapse is likely to occur and the extent to which humanity is likely to regulate its own 
expansion. Perhaps the only answer to the first question is “nobody knows for sure,” although 
many commentators seem to concur that the answer is probably “when there are more people 
than there are now.” As Joel Cohen (1996), who has written the definitive tract—How Many 
People Can the Earth Support?—notes, the issue may not be so much how many people can the 
earth support as what kind of earth is consistent with a human population of any given size. 
Although world population rose over the past decade at roughly the same average annual 
rate of 1.5%, there also seems to be emerging evidence that the rate of population growth is 
slowing. A United Nations 2002 report, World Population Prospects, predicts a population of 
some 8.9 billion in 2050. This increase of nearly 3 billion over the current total represents more 
additional people than the total number who were alive in 1950, but it also reflects a significant 
reduction in growth rates: it implies an average annual rate of growth over the next half-century 
of less than half the current growth rate. Even this rate overstates the long-term trend, as most 
experts agree that population growth will slow to a halt at some point in the next century or two 
(if, that is, numbers do not first decline). 
The prediction of a stable (as opposed to collapsing) population itself reflects some 
optimism concerning the ingenuity or self-discipline of humanity. This optimism arises in large 
part from the experience of the world’s wealthier nations. There is a pronounced, if imperfect, 
correlation between nations’ wealth and their population growth rates. Poor nations tend to have 
high rates of population growth—despite often appalling rates of infant and overall mortality. In 
contrast, some rich nations are now facing potential fiscal crises as their aging populations reach 
retirement age with few young workers to take their places. Immigration may be required if the 
elders of today’s wealthy nations are to retain their standard of living. 
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So, taken in aggregate, world economic performance has increased, the perception of 
improvement survives translation into per capita figures, and there is reason for hope that we will 
not overwhelm the planet with our sheer numbers. Even these observations do not point to 
entirely rosy prospects, however. As we have just noted, population growth rates tend to be 
higher among the poorer nations. And the plight of the poor remains heartbreaking. Average 
figures mask the fact that the distribution of income remains highly skewed. Well over a billion 
people now eke out the best living they can on an income of about a dollar a day. Recall that this 
is about half of world per capita income in 1800. 
The plight of the poor raises two disquieting worries: either the poor may become 
wealthy, or they may not. Though it may seem a wonderful thing for the world’s poor to become 
wealthy, the prospect brings the issues of scarcity and growth into stark relief. A billion or so 
wealthy people are now exposing the earth to unprecedented environmental threats. Can the 
planet tolerate 8 billion people living the lifestyle of the wealthy? 
Or, as no less a humanitarian than Jesus himself said, “ye have the poor with you always” 
(Mark 3:8). Millennia ago, a few thousand wealthy nobles enjoyed greater material wealth than 
did a few million struggling peasants. Now a billion-odd denizens of the wealthy industrial 
countries enjoy far greater health, wealth, and prospects than do the billions who live hand-to-
mouth. Philosophers might debate whether current inequities are more troubling than historical 
ones, but no one would suggest either is ideal. It is troubling that there is little compelling 
evidence that the world’s poor are catching up to the wealthy (Pritchett 1997). Would we be 
satisfied living in a “sustainable” world if most people were frozen in a status in which they 
struggled to achieve subsistence? 
Such questions beg the larger question of what we mean by economic growth. If 
economic growth were necessarily linked with increases in the physical insults we impose on the 
earth, it seems clear that indefinite growth would not be desirable—or even possible. If economic 
growth among the poor meant that tomorrow’s poor would exactly replicate the production 
processes and consumption possibilities of today’s wealthy, we might also conclude that such 
growth is either illusory or a contradiction in terms. 
Yet economic growth has in fact been as much a qualitative as a quantitative 
phenomenon. The optimistic view of the improvements in productivity we have discussed means 
essentially that every year we acquire the ability to make greater physical quantities of outputs 
using smaller physical quantities of inputs. Moreover, every year we acquire the ability to make 
different outputs. Automakers may have made different choices than environmental advocates 
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might have wanted them to as they refined their designs, but cars today are very different than 
they were 50 or 75 years ago and, if we impose the standard of value-per-dollar-spent or hours-
worked-to-acquire, qualitatively better than their predecessors. The same might be said of 
airplanes, communications, fabrics, electric lights, office equipment, and virtually any other 
purchased good or service we might name. 
A problem is captured in the limitation “any other purchased good or service,” however. 
Any number of unpurchased goods and services deteriorated as incomes rose, populations 
increased, and the activities captured in the measured economy increased. Progress has 
undoubtedly been made in controlling the production and release of many pollutants. 
Researchers have identified an environmental Kuznets curve under which countries’ emissions 
of some pollutants first increase, then decrease, as their per capita wealth increases (Grossman 
and Krueger 1995). One might hope that airborne particulates, organic wastes in water, and other 
common pollutants would be controlled as incomes increase. 
This may be too optimistic a prognosis in several respects, however. First, there may be a 
composition effect in the income-pollution relationship. Wealthier societies often concentrate 
their own economic activity in high-technology and service industries, relegating—or perhaps 
even “exporting”—dirtier industries to less developed countries. Moreover, such composition 
effects may better explain the observed pattern of industries and pollution across countries at 
different income levels than the aggregate global emissions over time. It seems unlikely that 
every country will devote its economy to low-emissions manufacturing and services: someone 
will need to specialize in the industries in which pollution is more difficult to control. 
Second, not all pollutants can be expected to follow the inverted-U relationship of the 
environmental Kuznets curve. It is not clear exactly how dependent modern industrial economies 
are on fossil fuels, but wealthier countries generally consume more of them. Such fuels are the 
primary contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn drive global climate change. It 
seems unduly optimistic to suppose that the world as a whole will simply grow its way out of 
concern with climate change.  
Finally, greenhouse gases are an example of a process that cannot be quickly reversed. 
They are cumulative pollutants. It has been estimated that the atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide (CO2—the most important of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases) was more or 
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less stable at around 280 parts per million (ppm) for thousands of years.10 It began to increase 
following the Industrial Revolution, reaching 315 ppm in 1957 and some 362 ppm now 
(Vitousek et al. 1997). Even if all further CO2 gas emissions were to stop tomorrow, it would 
take quite some time for the atmospheric concentration to return to preindustrial levels. 
Changes in atmospheric chemistry may be slow to reverse. Losses in biological diversity 
are, on any reasonable scale, completely irreversible.11 It will make little difference to the 
preservation of biodiversity, then, if in 10, 100, or 1,000 years’ time human societies have found 
ways to reduce the chemical pollution, overharvesting, transport of exotic species, climate 
change, and most important, destruction of indigenous habitats that now threaten the species with 
which we share the planet.  
No one is certain how many species now live on earth. Estimates range from a few 
million to many tens of millions. New species come into being through a combination of 
geographical separation and genetic mutation. Existing species are extinguished when then 
cannot adapt to changes in habitat or compete with existing or introduced rivals. Recent 
estimates suggest, however, that human activities are multiplying the rate of extinction by many 
times its “background” level (Raven 2002). 
Our digressions concerning climate change and biodiversity underscore important aspects 
of the New Scarcity. Both climate and biodiversity provide global public goods. Everyone on 
earth is affected by changes in climate. Everyone on earth may be affected by changes in 
biological diversity and the ecological services diverse natural ecosystems provide. As we will 
detail in a moment, the spatial and temporal scale of the problems create tremendous challenges 
for policy. In the original Scarcity and Growth and in Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered, the 
general sense was that the mechanisms of markets were adequate to the task of allocating 
resources in an efficient and sustainable way. Most of the attention was on resources traded in 
markets, however—resources subject to traditional scarcity. In this volume the focus has largely 
shifted to the adequacy of our social mechanisms for coping with the New Scarcity. 
Let us now turn to the ways in which our authors have addressed these matters. 
                                                 
10 This can be inferred from its concentration in polar icecaps, as the snow that fell millennia ago has been insulated 
from the atmosphere by subsequent accumulations. 
11 During each of the five episodes of mass extinctions that have been identified in the geological record, large 
fractions of extant species were extinguished. Species diversity eventually recovered after each and eventually 
reached new highs, but the time span for restoration measures in the millions of years (Wilson 1992). 
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The Contributions 
In their contribution David Menzie, Donald Singer, and John H. DeYoung, Jr., survey a 
subject that was of tremendous importance in the first Scarcity and Growth: the physical 
availability of resources. These authors reach some conclusions that echo those of earlier 
investigators. They conclude that the supply of minerals per se is not a limit to growth. Yet 
causes for concern persist. Although abundant quantities of many resources remain, they are 
becoming progressively more remote. It is only natural that mineral (and fuel and biological) 
resource stocks were most intensively exploited first in the areas closest to where they were used. 
As demands increased, exploration and eventually extraction took place across oceans, in 
inhospitable climates, and for minerals and fossil fuels especially, deeper and deeper beneath 
land and water. 
This situation again raises the classic tension between the depletion of (easily accessible, 
at least) resources on one hand and exploration- and extraction-cost-reducing technological 
progress on the other. Many of the facts Menzie, Singer, and DeYoung present can be seen as 
analogous to a glass either half full or half empty. Per capita consumption of many minerals has 
remained relatively steady in the developed nations, despite talk of the “dematerialization” of 
economies dominated by high-technology and service industries. As less developed countries 
become wealthier, their consumption may be poised to increase to levels comparable to those of 
the industrialized nations. An optimistic view is that resource scarcity has yet to decrease use in 
an ever-wealthier and more populous world. In fact, an optimist might be further buoyed by the 
observation that wealthy countries have not even been compelled to resort to substitutes for 
common mineral commodities (of which optimists would suppose there to be many). A more 
pessimistic view is that we simply do not have adequate reserves to suppose that ever-growing 
numbers of people can all consume at the level to which the wealthy have grown accustomed. 
Recent trends in exploration effort might also motivate similarly dichotomous views. 
Menzie, Singer, and DeYoung note with some concern declines in mineral exploration budgets, 
research expenditures, and training. Here a pessimistic view would be that this lack of 
preparation could reflect, at best, a lack of foresight, and at worst, a recognition that such effort 
would be futile given the existing state of depletion. Yet one might as easily take the contrary 
view that the reason for a decline in exploration is to be found in the recognition that known 
stocks will be adequate, and new ones can be identified as needed. 
One thing that does come through clearly, however, is that society is increasingly 
recognizing the nonmarket costs of mineral extraction. More and more land is being placed off-
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limits to such activities, either in appreciation for the unique services provided by pristine 
landscapes or in recognition of the incompatibility of mining and residential uses. Moreover, 
similar concerns arise with respect to the residuals arising from mining: society is less willing to 
tolerate the pollution and degradation that unrestricted extraction can impose.  
Here again one might take either an optimistic or a pessimistic view. The pessimist may 
see the increasing environmental restrictions placed on mining as further evidence of the 
constraints resource scarcity places on us: both minerals and pristine ecosystems are becoming 
scarce, and scarcity of one imposes further pressure upon the other. A world confronted with 
such interlocking constraints simply cannot afford to continue in its ways. The optimist could 
reply that the fact that the world has continued in its ways indicates that we have the means to 
continue our material consumption while preserving our environment.  
Optimists of a different stripe might take another tack, however. Whether or not the 
preservation of natural landscapes proves compatible with continuing our level of physical 
consumption or, more generally, our overall well-being, the fact is that something has been  
done to preserve natural landscapes. Voters have voted, legislators have legislated, and as 
Menzie, Singer, and DeYoung note, nongovernmental environmental interest groups have taken 
action to restrict environmental harms. Reasonable people can differ as to whether such 
developments represent overreactions or an instance of too little too late, but they do suggest that 
there is a marketplace of ideas and policies in which the New Scarcity has begun to be discussed 
and addressed.  
Jeffrey Krautkraemer surveys some of the same territory as do Menzie, Singer, and 
DeYoung in his contribution, titled “Economics of Scarcity: State of the Debate.” He also 
marshals extensive economic as well as physical data on resources. In updating many of the 
figures presented by Barnett and Morse, he generally confirms their findings after a span of some 
40 years. The real prices of most commodities have declined since 1960.  
Krautkraemer’s figures highlight some other important developments, however. 
Researchers could not have argued that resource prices were generally falling in 1980. Many 
mineral and food prices peaked at approximately the same time as did those of fossil fuels. 
Although different commentators express different opinions, it seems again that conflicting 
conclusions might each be supported by the data. On one hand, one might assert that the 1970s 
and early 1980s were a historical aberration in the long-run trend of declining real resources 
prices. On the other, one might say that the past two decades have been the aberration, a 
temporary—and perhaps final?—respite from inexorable scarcity. 
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The pessimism of the latter conclusion might be refuted by reference to futures markets 
and the prices of underlying assets. If it is generally felt that resource prices will increase over 
time, rational investors will bid up the current prices of, for example, oil leases and mining sites. 
Although confidence in the rationality of investors is an article of faith among many economists, 
observers from other disciplines draw different conclusions. That confidence has surely been 
shaken by the economy’s recent experience with “irrational exuberance” in other asset markets. 
The evidence from existing markets for assets that have entered the market economy is, 
then, generally positive but admittedly mixed, and subject to the skepticism of those reluctant to 
accept economists’ common postulate that markets reflect the foresight of rational participants. 
Krautkraemer also surveys some physical evidence concerning the state of resources that are not 
traded in markets. There is greater cause for concern over the status of air, water, climate, and 
biological diversity. Again, however, the question remains open as to whether emerging 
institutions and instruments for the allocation and preservation of these nonmarket resources will 
be adequate to the task of securing a sustainable future in the face of the New Scarcity. 
This question is taken up in greater detail by David Tilman and Stephen Polasky. Their 
contribution, “Ecosystem Goods and Services and their Limits: The Roles of Biological 
Diversity and Management Practices,” details concerns with what may be one of the most 
profound but perhaps least understood changes humanity is working on the planet. 
Paleobiologists have identified five episodes of mass extinctions in the geological record. Each 
was likely caused by volcanic or astronomical cataclysm. The most recent occurred some 65 
million years ago, when an asteroid impact plunged the earth into darkness and exterminated the 
dinosaurs, among many other less well-known forms of life. 
Many natural scientists now warn that we are entering a sixth “extinction crisis.” This, in 
contrast to the first five, is believed to be caused by the increasing dominance of a single species: 
Homo sapiens. The numbers we have cited above concerning the growth of human population 
and of our economies may have a darker side in terms of our impact on the other forms of life 
with which we share the planet. An often-cited article by Peter Vitousek and his colleagues has 
estimated that humanity appropriates either directly or indirectly 40% of the world’s 
accumulation of biomass in plants (known formally as “net primary productivity”). Other indices 
of our impact are as alarming. It has been estimated that the natural background rate of species 
extinction is one species per million per year. Some scientists suggest that the current rate of 
extinction exceeds the background rate by a factor of 1,000.  
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Biodiversity loss stems from many causes—human-induced factors in addition to natural 
threats from competition and predation. Some species (such as passenger pigeons and dodos) 
have been hunted to extinction, or nearly so (blue whales, otters). Others, particularly on islands, 
have been outcompeted or preyed upon by exotic species introduced by human travelers. 
Chemical pollution threatens still others. The effects of climate change on biodiversity are 
difficult to predict but potentially profound. Many biologists believe, however, that the single 
greatest threat to biodiversity today comes from the conversion of natural habitats to alternative 
human use. The native forests, prairies, and wetlands of the world are being felled, plowed, and 
drained for factories, homes, and farms. When natural habitats disappear, so do the organisms 
that depend upon them. 
What does this “cost” us? To many people, such a question will either seem crass (“How 
can we put a price on life!”), or its answer obvious (“It is costing us our soul!”). There are more 
pragmatic answers to the question, however. Although economists and ecologists have not yet 
been able to provide any concise dollars-and-cents answers, Tilman and Polasky have been at the 
forefront of efforts to provide quantitative estimates of the effects of biodiversity loss. 
Less diverse habitats are demonstrably less productive by various measures that both 
ecologists and economists might think important. Tilman and Polasky report the results 
experiments in which less diverse habitats have been shown to produce less biomass, leach more 
nutrients, and otherwise perform worse than do more diverse natural assemblages. The authors 
also present some simple conceptual models explaining why such results might arise. 
The observation that more diverse habitats are, in some sense, “better” than those 
converted to other human uses begs some questions, of course. Obviously, if everyone thought 
natural landscapes superior to simplified and managed landscapes everywhere, no natural 
landscapes would be converted to alternative uses. The problem, then, arises if too many natural 
landscapes are converted, or used too intensively. That is, there is a problem if those who convert 
natural landscapes to artificial ones for their own benefits impose additional costs and burdens  
on others. 
This, however, is precisely what the problem with biodiversity loss may be. The people 
who clear the land that shelters biodiversity derive private benefits from doing so, but most of 
the costs of biodiversity loss may be spillovers accruing to other people at other locations. This 
would be the case with ecosystem services—water purification, habitat for organisms that 
control pests and pollinate crops, prevention of erosion, and a host of others.  
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More generally, everyone in the world may be rendered spiritually poorer for the loss of 
the other species with which we share the planet. Barnett and Morse quoted at some length from 
John Stuart Mill’s writings in Scarcity and Growth. Let us repeat a shorter passage here: 
Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left 
to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into 
cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every flowery 
waste or nature pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not 
domesticated for man’s use exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or 
superfluous tree rooted out and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower 
could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved 
agriculture.  
This sentiment is perhaps even more valid today that it was when Mill wrote it a century 
and a half ago. Tilman and Polasky remind us that we ignore our relationship with dynamic 
creation at peril to both our physical and spiritual well-being. Regrettably, there is probably less 
attention to the biological aspects of the New Scarcity than to the chemical. 
The chemical aspect of the New Scarcity that has attracted the greatest attention in recent 
years is global warming. The Swedish chemist Svente Arrhenius predicted as early as 1896 that 
the anthropogenic release of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels would lead to global 
warming via a greenhouse effect. A potpourri of gases have been identified as having such 
effects, but carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas because the mass 
of its anthropogenic releases is greatest. Burning fossil fuels—petroleum-based distillates, coal, 
and natural gas—releases carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. So does felling forests. Both 
activities take place on a huge scale. 
Christian Azar considers policies to address climate change in his contribution, 
“Emerging Scarcities—Bioenergy-Food Competition in a Carbon Constrained World.” His 
message illustrates a combination of both possibilities and concerns that exemplify the 
challenges embodied in the New Scarcity. Although it is clearly possible to do something about 
the problem of climate change, the generation and adoption of new technologies could have 
profound effects on the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
The challenges are daunting, however. First, let us consider the magnitude of the 
problem. People in the United States produce approximately 17 times as much CO2 per capita as 
do people in the developing nations of Africa and the Asian subcontinent. Stabilizing CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere would require that the per capita emissions of the wealthy 
countries plummet to the current levels of the world’s poorest nations. If business continues as 
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usual, it seems more likely that the emissions of the poor countries would increase to the levels 
of the wealthy. 
This need not be the case, however. There are technological alternatives that might yield 
comparable quantities of usable energy without further increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations. The theme of Azar’s chapter, however, is that we should be careful not to create 
or exacerbate one set of problems in our attempt to solve another. Consider, for example, greater 
reliance on nuclear power. This might represent a Faustian bargain: the current generation would 
be producing highly poisonous spent fuel whose safekeeping would need to be passed on to 
future generations. Although technological fixes may arise, supposing that they will seems 
unwarrantedly optimistic. 
Moreover, nuclear technology raises uncomfortable issues concerning the poorly 
understood aspects of social relationships. Howard Barnett may have again been prescient when 
in 1979 he offered his perspective in Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered. Among many other 
observations, he noted that  
[t]he nuclear nightmare is rooted in military and political affairs and 
violence, not in economic growth. The dangers…are societal terrorism, violence, 
mass destruction, and related political problems.…The solutions for 
environmental pollution are relatively simple and at hand…this cannot be said of 
nuclear dangers. 
If the “solutions for environmental pollution” are not, in fact, “relatively simple and at 
hand” in an era in which climate change and biodiversity loss create problems of global scope, it 
is hard to disagree with his assessment of the dangers of “societal terrorism, mass destruction, 
and related political problems.” In 1945 the world’s wealthiest nation produced its first atomic 
weapons. Little more than half a century later, India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices—and 
made ominous threats to use them against each other. Recent events have led the world to doubt 
that even “peaceful” nuclear programs would prove entirely benign. Presidents and prime 
ministers around the world spend sleepless nights worrying about nuclear weapons falling into 
the hands of terrorists. 
What may seem a more benign solution to the problem of climate change is to meet our 
energy needs in a renewable and sustainable way. Azar provides some rough estimates of what 
would be required if the world were to avert climate change by relying to a greater degree on 
biomass—crops grown for their energy value. Could it be done? Perhaps. What would be the 
consequences? Most likely, a sizable increase in the amount of the globe placed under cultivation 
  21Resources for the Future  Simpson, Toman, Ayres 
and with it, an appreciable increase in the price of food to the developing world, as well as 
further reduction in the amount of relatively unspoiled habitat maintained to support biodiversity. 
There is perhaps no better source of far-fetched anecdotes than the projections that 
“experts” of previous decades or centuries made of the circumstances of their descendants. 
Azar’s calculations are offered with appropriate modesty. Regardless of whether his particular 
scenarios come true—or whether the options he identifies are chosen over others—he illustrates 
a general principle. The New Scarcity is actually a complex of interrelated scarcities that cannot 
be considered in isolation. If the potential of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases without 
overheating is truly limited, we must look to alternatives that may themselves reduce arable land 
and biological diversity, increase the need for international oversight of nuclear programs, and 
induce other major social and physical changes virtually ad infinitum. 
Having said all this, we know that hope springs eternal and need not always be 
disappointed by harsh realities. We employ technologies our great-great-grandparents never 
imagined, and our great-great-grandchildren may regard our circumstances as similarly rustic. 
Still, Azar’s chapter reminds of us several things. One is simply that we are confronted by 
emerging and overlapping scarcities. A second is that resolution of these scarcities requires 
careful consideration of social policies, either for addressing them directly or developing 
technological alternatives. 
A third issue is that inventing new technologies may involve unleashing genies from 
bottles. Nuclear power and weapons are perhaps the foremost examples, but the advent of 
biotechnology is another. The techniques of genetic modification may allow spectacular 
advances in medicine, agriculture, and industry. They also spark fears of ecological catastrophe 
and, in the hands of the insane or disgruntled, could lead to the creation of terrifying epidemics—
“the poor man’s nukes,” as some worried strategists call them. It may be worth remembering that 
we do not always appreciate the ramifications of our technologies initially.  
Most of what we have said thus far involves, in one aspect or another, notions of 
“sustainability.” This term has been used increasingly frequently since it entered the popular 
lexicon at the time of the Brundtland Commission’s report in 1987. As John Pezzey and Michael 
Toman note in their contribution, “Sustainability and Its ‘Economic’ Interpretations,” however, 
part of the appeal of the term is its lack of precision. It is difficult to be opposed to a concept that 
essentially means “intergenerational fairness,” especially if the person proposing it is not 
required to say what she means by “fair.” 
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We might all agree that fairness means that no one should be treated better than anyone 
else. Beyond that, however, we run into a number of difficult philosophical problems. Pezzey 
and Toman distinguish “weak” from “strong” sustainability. The former essentially means that 
earlier generations are not better off than are later. The latter seeks to guarantee that outcome by 
ensuring that later generations do not have to make do with depleted assets relative to those 
enjoyed by their ancestors. 
Such definitions beg many questions, however. Strong sustainability, if taken to an 
extreme, admits a reductio ad absurdum. Even if a society took the strongest possible measures 
to preserve all aspects of its natural, technological, and social assets for posterity, it would be 
impossible to accomplish this end literally. Just as one cannot step into the same river twice, 
natural processes alone will ensure that there are some differences in the constellation of assets 
available from one generation to the next. Defining a sustainable world as one in which “natural” 
processes are free to run their course begs the question of what is natural when humans take 
conscious steps to intervene or not intervene in natural processes. 
Much of the debate surrounding sustainability concerns the possibilities for substitution 
among assets. Advocates of a “strong” form of sustainability generally argue that opportunities 
for substitution between natural capital, such as that represented by diverse natural ecosystems 
and the climate moderation and waste disposal services of the atmosphere, and anything that 
humanity can manufacture are, at least under the conditions in which we now find ourselves, 
very limited. Further reductions in natural capital could prove catastrophic, as there is no 
alternative to its use. 
These are the types of questions that arise in the tricky navigation among concepts and 
criteria of sustainability. In Pezzey and Toman’s chapter, two other major issues arise. The first 
concerns when a market economy is sustainable. To some this will seem a rather strange 
question. Under some restrictive conditions that we will discuss further below, a market 
economy can be shown to satisfy certain optimality conditions. What would it mean if an 
economy were optimal but not sustainable?  
Pezzey and Toman suggest that the paradox of an unsustainable market economy can be 
resolved by postulating dual roles for individuals, as both consumers and citizens. I can, as a 
consumer, behave as the textbook Homo economicus who maximizes his satisfactions by 
undertaking economic transactions. As a citizen, however, I may have a different outlook and 
pursue different objectives. I may manifest a concern for future generations that belies the 
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maximize-discounted-present-value objective economists presume and, perhaps, private 
consumers pursue. 
The idea that we pursue different agendas as consumers than as citizens is not really that 
unusual and leads into the second major issue in discussing the sustainability of market 
economies. As citizens, those of us fortunate enough to live in democratic societies regularly 
vote to express our preferences for public policies to restrain our excesses as consumers and 
producers. A market economy can achieve a socially optimal allocation of resources across time 
without resorting to any central system of command and control if there are no externalities—
costs or benefits generated by one party that accrue to others, and for which no payment is 
rendered. Such externalities are the very essence of the New Scarcity. When there are 
externalities, there is no guarantee that a free market will allocate goods optimally over time, or 
even across consumers in a given period. It is not, then, necessarily a contradiction in terms, nor 
does it reflect a philosophical inconsistency, to ask whether our economy achieves socially 
desirable outcomes or sustains our long-run well-being. 
The next several contributions investigate the processes by which technological 
innovations are generated and applied. Robert Ayres’s perspective is largely historical. In 
“Resources, Scarcity, Technology and Growth,” he traces the development of important 
technologies of the 18th through 20th centuries. In the cases of coal-fired steam engines, the 
development of practicable technology for aluminum smelting, and the rise and spread of 
electrification, he identifies common themes. One is that one innovation begets another, leading 
eventually to feedback loops. An early application of the steam engine was pumping water from 
coal mines. This made it possible to mine deeper, leading to greater availability of coal, which 
led in turn to wider application of this relatively compact source of energy to industry and 
transportation. Railroads brought coal to steel mills, where it was used fire furnaces from which 
were forged more rails and parts for larger and stronger steam engines. Similar feedback loops 
among innovations characterize the development of other industries. 
These cycles of development have interesting attributes. One is that they often drive a 
rebound effect in which scarcity of a resource motivates an innovation that, through cycles of 
synergies and recombinations with other innovations, eventually results in far more consumption 
of the resource whose perceived scarcity drove the original innovation. Steam engines were first 
used to facilitate the recovery of coal. Once the steam engine had been developed and applied to 
transport and industry, it spurred the creation of innumerable other innovations, and far more 
coal was mined and consumed than before its invention. 
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Ayres emphasizes that innovation displays a fundamentally episodic character, with 
relatively narrow sectoral impacts in most instances. Major innovations, such as the development 
of the steam engine, appear as discrete events in the historical record. Such breakthroughs 
constitute major, discontinuous changes in possibilities. Between breakthroughs, long periods of 
incremental improvement occur. Eventually, however, the momentum of the breakthrough 
innovation dissipates and the pace of change slows until the record is punctuated with another 
breakthrough. 
Such a pattern might be explained by a more sophisticated depiction of the process of 
innovation than that we sketched above. Although innovations are nonrival goods in many 
important respects, the scope over which spillovers can occur may be limited. Innovations build 
upon a core technology and are, to some extent, specific to it. Extended periods of innovation 
and growth are observed, but eventually possibilities for further improvement are limited by the 
core technology upon which they build. 
Ayres suggests that another form of New Scarcity is coming into focus: scarcity of 
attractive opportunities for extracting traditional natural resources and turning them into finished 
materials or “useful work,” such as electric power. Such useful work is, in turn, an input into 
many other downstream goods and services. Ayres finds the example of electric power especially 
compelling in this regard. The efficiency of electric power production from the heat of 
combustion increased very rapidly during the first half of the 20th century and resulted in rapid 
price reductions that stimulated new applications and industries. This progress has slowed 
dramatically since 1960. 
New knowledge has accumulated much more rapidly in other fields, such as information 
technology. Despite the widespread enthusiasm for the “new economy” of the 1990s, however, it 
is far from clear that information technologies will fuel continued productivity growth. Ayres 
cautions that economic growth may not continue indefinitely at historical rates—or that there 
could be a prolonged slowdown before the rates of the past century are matched again. 
It is surely too early to label the general economic decline since 2000 a long-term 
slowdown, but the prospect that we might be entering such a period concerns Ayres. Energy 
resources are limited both by their own inherent scarcity and by their environmental 
consequences. Our age needs a breakthrough that will not only reduce our dependence on 
nonrenewable energy and the environmental consequences of its use, but also enable or create 
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new applications and industries. Ayres sees no such options imminently available. A 
breakthrough might require massive investment, and public intervention may be called upon to 
finance and motivate it. 
That last notion provides an apt lead-in to Sjak Smulders’s contribution, “Endogenous 
Technical Change, Natural Resources, and Growth.” One of the most important developments in 
economics since the contributions to Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered were written has been a 
closer investigation of determinants and consequences of innovative activity. As we noted above, 
innovation and environmental improvement share a distinctive feature: providers of each 
generate benefits that they typically cannot fully internalize themselves. Hence, there is a prima 
facie case for public intervention to encourage socially beneficial improvements. 
Smulders takes up this theme in his chapter. He makes several points for students of 
technological change as it relates to resource scarcity. First, one should not automatically jump to 
the conclusion that technological innovation is a panacea for coping with resource scarcity. 
Technological advances may create opportunities for substituting away from scarce resources. 
They might also, however, result in the more rapid degradation of such resources. As an 
example, one need only consider many of the world’s fisheries: “better” technologies have led to 
the more rapid decline of fish stocks. 
That example highlights the importance of policy interventions. In the case of fisheries, 
steps need to be taken to reduce the “common property” problem that arises when fish stocks are 
open to exploitation by whoever can first capture them. As we have already remarked, a similar 
but opposite problem arises in innovation: since the benefits of innovations may be appropriated 
by people who do not pay for their generation, innovations may be undersupplied. This 
observation again underscores the main point. Policy interventions will generally be required 
first, to prevent the overexploitation of the resources whose degradation is the subject of the New 
Scarcity, and second, to provide the impetus for innovations that will further reduce pressure on 
such resources. 
Smulders notes another interesting issue. What are the long-term prospects for humanity 
if we are, in fact, confronted with an insurmountable limit on our material resources? As we saw 
above, economists have had very different perspectives on these matters over the years. Classical 
economists applied the principle of diminishing returns in conjunction with the assumption of 
fixed resources and concluded that our long-term prospect was for stagnation, if not decline. 
Later economists, buoyed by evidence that productivity continued to increase even as resources 
generally declined, came to more optimistic conclusions. 
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Still, it may be naively optimistic to suppose that technological innovations will fall as 
manna from heaven in perpetuity. Innovation is, as Smulders points out, an economic activity 
like any other. Innovative activity responds to incentives. In economic analysis, the returns to 
one factor of production are an increasing function of the quantities of others. Thus, if natural 
inputs remain a constraint, even incentives for further innovation could someday dwindle. This 
unhappy state of affairs might still be averted even if we do not benefit from a rain of innovation 
in perpetuity, however. Knowledge itself may be a capital stock that grows over time to offset 
the constraints imposed by natural resources. In this scenario the growing economy pulls itself 
up by its own bootstraps. 
The subjects Smulders surveys are very much at the cutting edge of modern economic 
research, and progress on these topics has had a profound effect on our understanding of the 
economy. Yet these topics are also very much in a long-standing tradition in economic thought, 
in which forward-looking agents respond in rational fashion to economic incentives. In his 
contribution, titled “Evolutionary Analysis of the Relationship between Economic Growth, 
Environmental Quality and Resource Scarcity,” Jeroen van den Bergh explores a different 
perspective. Economists often assume that observed behaviors can be explained as maximizing 
the welfare of the individuals displaying them. Biologists, on the other hand, generally assume 
that observed behaviors are those passed along by individuals whom nature has selected to 
survive and reproduce. Van den Bergh describes an evolutionary approach to economics that 
adopts principles from both disciplines but also generates new insights. 
Evolution depends on several elements: variety, innovation, selection, and inheritance. A 
major challenge in developing an evolutionary economics is to identify the mechanisms that 
generate these elements. To the extent that this can be done, however, the results can prove quite 
edifying. Van den Bergh demonstrates that an evolutionary perspective can be particularly 
enlightening when we are considering how a group of organisms—humanity in this case—
shapes, and is shaped by, its environment. 
From such a perspective, certain common notions in economics become less clear-cut. 
Much of what is written about the virtues of markets concerns the ability of individual 
“optimizers” to produce “efficient” outcomes. From an evolutionary perspective, however, an 
“optimum” may at best be a transient and local phenomenon. The outcome at any point in time 
may depend upon the path by which it was reached, and multiple selection factors are at work. 
Moreover, the adaptation resulting from selection only converges to a long-term steady state if 
the natural environment shaping evolution is static. When social and natural systems coevolve, it 
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is problematic to describe developments in the former as progress when we are necessarily 
unsure as to the effects they will have on the latter. 
An evolutionary perspective may also motivate a different view of policy formulation. It 
is common in economics to suppose that social planners are just another set of rational 
optimizing agents, defined as maximizers of some social. Even if we can speak meaningfully of 
a role for rationally directed policymakers in a model in which selection occurs by the 
application of exogenous standards of fitness to agents whose attributes have been randomly 
generated, such policymakers may have a different role in evolutionary than in traditional 
models. The maintenance of variability is important in providing for the selection of fit types  
in rapidly changing environments. Perhaps the objective of policymakers should not be so much 
to identify winning ideas as to retain enough of the also-rans to provide options should 
conditions change. 
Debates about the capacity of technology to alleviate scarcity of natural and 
environmental resources normally center on technical feasibility in resource substitution. 
Sometimes they extend to consider whether a new technology will account for more or less harm 
or good to natural resources and environments than the old. A prototypical example of such 
debates is the application of genetically modified organisms in agriculture, where individuals of 
different persuasions debate the ability of these organisms to sustain increases in agricultural 
productivity and reduce chemical inputs versus their potential to harm other organisms. Nuclear 
power offers another example—a source of electricity without conventional pollutants or 
greenhouse gas emissions but with a legacy of nuclear waste that is toxic to the environment and 
to humans as well as hard to manage. 
More recently, concerns about the use of technology vis-à-vis broader questions of social 
progress and stability and risk management have been on the upswing. For example, both nuclear 
and genetic recombination technologies can be seen as posing risks not just because of their 
unintended environmental consequences, but also because of their potential for deliberate and 
malicious misuse. As technologies grow more complex, moreover, questions increasingly arise 
about the public’s ability to understand and compare their risks, and even whether the various 
risks and benefits are comparable. Yet it seems that in much of the modern literature on scarcity 
and growth, technologies are simply means by which to expand society’s production 
possibilities. Much less concern is generally expressed over how technology and society relate in 
a broader sense. 
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In her reflections on these subjects, Sylvie Faucheux brings to bear many of the concepts 
of strong sustainability that have become central in the European community of ecological 
economics. She argues in particular that the evaluation of technology’s risks and benefits cannot 
be undertaken apart from the social context in which they are experienced, requiring therefore 
more place-based analysis and public participation in assessment and decisionmaking. She also 
argues that with the growing complexity of technological and other risks faced by citizens, the 
premise that all risks and rewards can be put into a common comparison is increasingly open to 
question. There are reasons to believe that individual people exhibit a kind of risk aversion that 
puts a premium on avoiding major and uncertain changes to the status quo of complex natural 
systems. This line of argument puts Faucheux at odds with the mainstream of natural resource 
and environmental economics, especially in the United States. Even if one does not accept her 
other conclusions, however, it is difficult to dispute the point that reducing the conditions that 
cause social instability—poverty and injustice—may be as valuable in the portfolio of social 
investments as expanding technological capacities. 
David Pearce and Molly Macauley consider policy choices from more conventional, 
albeit not entirely standard perspectives. In “Environmental Policy as a Tool for Sustainability,” 
Pearce investigates the problem of how society should deal with the New Scarcity of 
environmental resources. Pearce begins by noting the similarities and differences between the 
old and new scarcities. Concerns over the Old Scarcity revolved around the adequacy of stocks 
of mineral, fuel, and other resources. Many commentators dismissed such concerns by noting 
that these resources were traded in markets. As resources became scarce, their prices would 
increase to reflect that scarcity, and three responses would arise: consumers would economize on 
their use, substitutes would be identified and exploited, and new technologies would be 
developed to further economize on use and introduce more substitutes. 
In addressing the New Scarcity of environmental resources, it may seem natural, then, to 
emulate the markets in which other natural resources are traded. If environmental assets are, in 
fact, growing scarce, the prices assigned to their further degradation will rise, and we can expect 
the same pattern of economizing on use, employment of substitutes, and investment in 
innovation to arise. 
As Pearce points out, however, such a scenario presumes that certain prerequisites have 
already been met. Suggesting that, to cite the environmental economist’s mantra, we “get the 
prices right” presumes, first, that society has determined that environmental resources are in fact 
growing scarce, and second, that this scarcity has risen to a level of concern in which public 
sector involvement is required. Having made these determinations, we can turn to the details of 
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how to structure environmental policy. In many nations, however—particularly the poor 
countries of the developing world—there is as yet no social consensus that environmental 
problems actually motivate the sacrifices required to address them. 
It is not surprising that there is a sort of geographical hierarchy determining which 
problems are addressed first in developing countries. Water pollution, for example, is often a 
relatively local problem that can be addressed with relatively simple measures, such as 
improving sanitation systems. Air pollution may be both more widespread and more complex: 
emissions of greenhouse gases and losses of biodiversity arise from local action but have global 
consequences. We would expect—and evidence seems to confirm—that generating the social 
consensus required for action on these problems will be more difficult than addressing 
environmental problems at more local levels. 
In a sense, the stages of development of environmental policy Pearce proposes overlap. A 
society is more likely act on its recognition that the scarcity of environmental resources has 
reached critical proportions if it recognizes relatively low-cost ways in which to ameliorate such 
scarcity. Moreover, we might suppose that a society otherwise committed to the principles of a 
market economy might be more willing to address its environmental issues if it could apply to 
them the apparatus of the market economy. 
Those observations emphasize the central paradox Pearce’s essay investigates: why is it 
that market-based instruments (MBIs) are, as yet, so rarely employed? Pearce is careful not to 
overstate the case. There are enough instances of fuel and effluent taxes and tradable permits in 
air pollutants as to establish MBIs as more than experimental approaches to environmental 
policy. Still, given the enthusiasm expressed for them among economists (and, increasingly, 
elements in the environmental advocacy community), MBIs remain largely conspicuous by  
their absence. 
The reasons for this paucity are myriad. First and perhaps most obviously, many 
countries, particularly those of the developing world, have few environmental regulations of any 
kind. Once sufficient social pressure mounts to implement some such regulations, newly 
empowered regulators often find themselves in dire circumstances. It is then time to do 
something clear and definite, rather than fumbling with the niceties of guessing what economic 
measures will yield which physical results. The certainty attached to requiring specific measures 
may often be preferred to what may seem the less tangible benefits of implementing more 
flexible incentives.  
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Once an environmental administration is established with an emphasis on technical, as 
opposed to economic, concerns, it may be difficult to reverse the culture of the organization. It is 
only natural that bureaucrats will seek to perform their duties in such a way as to maximize the 
demand for their own expertise. One advantage often claimed for MBIs is that they decentralize 
environmental decisionmaking by leaving the specifics of compliance to private agents. Viewed 
from a bureaucrat’s perspective, however, eliminating the need for her own management 
expertise may seem less of an advantage. 
Other factors in determining public policy toward the environment may be still more 
malign. Although much of the focus in environmental policymaking is on improving on policies 
that are already good, in the sense that they tend to improve environmental performance, great 
progress might also be made by reforming policies that are demonstrably bad. Many 
commentators bemoan the continuing existence of perverse subsidies—payments that, by 
encouraging profligate use of resources, result in their greater degradation. While lamentable, it 
is, perhaps, not surprising that perverse subsidies continue. Large economic players wield 
political clout. Environmental degradation is a problem in large part because important elements 
of society realize private gain—albeit at the expense of losses to the broader public—by 
engaging in activities that degrade the environment. It should not be surprising that such major 
players find ways to underwrite their activities with public funds. 
That last observation may be offset in part if conventional wisdom is valid: that 
environmental improvement tends also to be a popular cause among the wealthy. However, this 
constituency may be more often motivated by fervor than by careful economic analysis. 
Efficiency per se has a limited constituency (Stroup 2003), a view that Pearce echoes in noting 
that aside from academicians, there is limited lobbying for MBIs.  
The form in which environmental policy is implemented may seem a matter of less 
importance in responding to the New Scarcity than the question of whether to institute some 
form of environmental policy. However, Pearce suggests that activists will not begin to achieve 
their goals until they come to some accommodation with economic interests. Halting economic 
development is simply not an option. Overcoming resistance to cost-effective environmental 
regulation is, then, in some respects tantamount to overcoming resistance to environmental 
regulation generally. 
Molly Macauley’s contribution, “Public Policy: Inducing Investments in Innovation,” 
addresses the other aspect of public policy that bears strongly on the resolution of scarcity: 
technological innovation. Governments have provided incentives for innovation almost as long 
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as there have been governments. The motivation lies in the characteristics of innovation that 
Robert Ayres explores in his chapter: new ideas often generate spillovers that can spread far 
beyond the industry or sector in which the original innovation was applied, and important 
technological innovations tend to reinforce each other. As we have also noted, the incentives for 
public underwriting of innovation are doubled when innovations ease the constraints imposed by 
the New Scarcity of environmental resources. 
The generality of the possible effects of broad-reaching spillovers can create wide 
opportunities for abuse, however. If we cannot predict the ultimate applications to which a 
particular innovation might be put, should society subsidize every innovation? For that matter, 
can we even distinguish innovation from other undertakings? Although Macauley states the 
conventional case for public support of innovative activity, she also points out the pitfalls  
of taking this principle too far. Publicly funded research may ease environmental problems,  
but it may also induce rent seeking among would-be recipients of public funds and generate 
wasteful “pork.” 
Macauley buttresses her conclusions with examples drawn from case studies. 
Governments have underwritten any number of research ventures in energy, resources, and 
environment (among other fields) with what have to be regarded as decidedly mixed results. 
There have been some successes, but there have also been spectacular failures, such as the U.S. 
synthetic fuels program. In that case, it appears that private industry more accurately predicted 
long-term price trends in fuels than did the government, which initiated a slap-dash program to 
combat an energy “crisis,” which two decades later had largely disappeared. It remains to be 
seen if other crises turn out to be more serious or enduring, but the synfuels program illustrates 
the pitfalls of devoting large sums of public money to poorly conceived ventures. 
Public policy can motivate innovation in other ways, however. Innovation may be 
motivated by the carrots of public research subsidies but can also be prompted by sticks, such as 
regulatory restrictions and taxes on pollutants. Conventional wisdom has it that MBIs are 
superior to other forms of regulation because they leave open to the regulated parties the issue of 
how best to reduce their costs of polluting. If regulated parties can accomplish the goal most 
efficiently by devising better modes of production and effluent control, MBIs will allow them to 
do so. 
That observation brings us back to the theme of Pearce’s paper: that MBIs, while perhaps 
becoming increasingly common, remain conspicuous by their general absence. Macauley adds 
another important cautionary note to Pearce’s recitation of the reasons for these circumstances: 
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the regulator who seeks purely to maximize social welfare in the absence of market failures is as 
much a fiction as is the perfect market of the introductory economics textbook. Idealized 
depictions of economies are useful as pedagogical devices and benchmarks against which to 
measure actual performance. The same might be said of idealized depictions of regulatory 
programs. Macauley reminds us, however, that policies must be made on the basis of 
comparisons of actual economic conditions and actual regulatory capacity and performance. 
Comparisons between ideals are generally irrelevant, and those between the actual performance 
of an unregulated economy and an unobtainable regulatory ideal are deceptive and can prove 
counterproductive. 
Although the authors of the contributions we have surveyed thus far make some mention 
of the importance of environmental resources in poor countries, their emphasis is largely on 
economic, social, and physical conditions in the wealthier countries. Yet there is widespread 
agreement both that the consequences of environmental degradation and resource scarcity are 
greatest for the poor, and that the greatest environmental challenge of our era is to raise the living 
standard of the poorest of the poor without further degrading the global environment. 
The final two contributions extend the analysis of scarcity and growth to the developing 
world. In “Intragenerational versus Intergenerational Equity: Views from the South,” Ramon 
Lopez elaborates on the theme of sustainability. He encapsulates a very telling point in a 
question: “Will governments that systematically neglect the welfare of the vast majority of the 
current population…consider the interests of those not yet born?” 
Lopez argues that much of the existing debate on sustainability ignores two crucial 
issues, both of which are raised in his question. First, sustainability is essentially a question of 
equity, and one cannot consistently espouse concern with intergenerational equity without also 
evidencing a corresponding concern with intragenerational equity. We should be at least as 
concerned with the plight of today’s poor as we are with that of tomorrow’s. 
Lopez’s second observation is that governments systematically neglect the welfare of the 
vast majority. Understandably, economists writing on the prospects for sustainable development 
emphasize economic policies and forces in their analyses. Yet in much of the world, the 
institutional underpinnings for well-functioning market economies are largely absent. Markets 
facilitate trade in goods and services, but the efficiency- and welfare-enhancing properties 
claimed for trade in goods and services do not arise from their appropriation or theft. Elite 
minorities in many developing countries appropriate their nations’ resources for their own 
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benefit while employing the private wealth they acquire to insulate themselves from the 
consequences of environmental degradation. 
To Lopez, then, effective policy intervention to institute sustainable development cannot 
be limited solely to working within the economic system to “get the prices right.” We must first 
get the institutions of governance right. Until we do the latter, there will be little incentive to do 
the former. 
Partha Dasgupta begins the final contribution by noting a revealing semantic distinction. 
Environment is, in the wealthier countries, an amenity or luxury good that comes to be in greater 
demand as income increases. This view leads to a one-sided policy prescription: since wealthier 
people demand cleaner environments, the solution to the developing world’s environmental 
problems lies in promoting its economic growth.  
This perspective and prescription are problematic in a couple of respects. With regard to 
the semantic point, Dasgupta argues that natural resources and environmental “amenities” are not 
luxuries, but rather necessities. Poor people have no substitutes for the filthy water and smoky air 
of their communities. Second, in prescribing economic growth as an antidote for environmental 
degradation, we need to be very careful about measuring growth. 
Dasgupta has titled his contribution “Sustainable Economic Development in the World of 
Today's Poor” (we have added the emphasis) and returns to themes introduced in Pezzey and 
Toman’s chapter on sustainability. An appropriate measure of yearly income is one reflecting the 
consumption possible at present without compromising future prospects. In both theory (as 
developed by Weitzman 1976) and practice, national income is calculated by adding together the 
market value of consumption and net investment.12 Suppose that the latter was markedly negative—
that the country whose national income was being calculated was liquidating its capital stock or 
allowing it to depreciate without replacing it. In such circumstances one should subtract the value of 
the lost capital stock from the value of consumption in calculating income. 
Amending accounts in this way is straightforward when the value of consumption and  
value of investment can be measured by simple accounting exercises. The value of consumption  
is typically the sum of all consumption goods produced, with each weighted by its market price.  
                                                 
12 The formula can be further elaborated to include government expenditure and net exports. 
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The value of investment is typically calculated in a parallel fashion, summing quantities weighted 
by prices.13 
Problems arise in attempting to do accounting in the absence of prices. Yet this is the 
situation, by definition, when nonmarket goods are involved. In the absence of actual prices, one 
must infer shadow prices from other markets or information. Dasgupta acknowledges the many 
practical impediments to estimating such prices but, making some heroic assumptions in the interest 
of illustration, presents figures that offer a sobering perspective on the true economic performance 
of the developing world. Nations that appear to be making substantial progress in rising from 
poverty may, on closer reflection, be accomplishing illusory growth by degrading their natural 
assets. In some of the world’s poorest regions, the outlook is dismal indeed. Official economic 
statistics indicate stagnation. When such assessments are amended to reflect environmental 
degradation, the scenario is worse yet. 
Dasgupta also demonstrates that similar concerns dog estimates of productivity. Imagine, for 
example, a nation that fuels its economy by felling ever larger portions of virgin forest. If there is no 
official market for trees (stumpage, in the forestry vernacular), it may appear that the economy is 
making more with less each year—until the trees run out. Thus, whether measured as high income 
growth rates or growing productivity, official statistics may not represent economic progress so 
much as the imminence of a bill coming due. 
Dasgupta notes that institutional changes can induce progress as much as can innovations in 
physical processes. Resources will be used more efficiently when institutions evolve so as require 
users to pay the full costs of their use; that is, the private costs of their current provision, the costs 
that may fall on future generations if such resources will no longer be available, and the costs that 
users of the resources may impose on other members of society because of the pollution, 
biodiversity loss, etc., they may occasion. Even though a society that makes more efficient use of its 
available resources will better serve the interests of its citizens in the long run, it may appear to be 
performing less well in the short run. This is because some resources are underpriced. The measured 
costs of production must increase when the prices of resources increase. 
                                                 
13 Year-to-year variations in price levels are accommodated by dividing aggregates by price indices, although the 
construction of such indices can be problematic. 
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That leads us again to the critical question of when and how society—or societies—will 
decide to acknowledge the New Scarcity and take steps to offset it. This is a fitting point on which 
to begin to sum up our themes. 
Scarcity and Growth in the New Millennium: A Synthesis 
The contributors are an eclectic group, and they come at a host of issues from a variety of 
perspectives. In her or his own way, however, each has addressed the essential question of how 
scarcity affects the prospects for growth.  
To organize our summary, let us consider how scarcity might constrain growth, and 
which scenarios seem most likely. 
• In the worst-case scenario, absolute limits on physical capacities might condemn 
humanity to stagnation—or worse. If an essential resource could not be renewed, we 
would, in the fullness of time, be doomed. 
• Slightly more favorable would be a situation in which an essential resource is 
renewable but only at a relatively slow rate. Although a sustainable path might be 
open to us, even an economy in which this essential resource is privately owned 
might not choose to follow it. 
• If essential but renewable resources are not traded in complete markets in which all 
aspects of their extraction, production, and use are incorporated in their prices, 
disaster could ensue unless public action is taken to address problems of pollution and 
degradation. 
• If no resources are essential, or if essential resources reproduce at a sufficiently rapid 
rate, a market economy could follow a sustainable path with no public oversight. 
None of our authors espouse the extreme views represented in the first and last 
possibilities above. None are saying that humanity is doomed, or even that a human population 
of the current size is doomed, nor are any saying that a laissez-faire policy in which all resource 
allocation decisions are left to private actors will ensure a rosy future. Although John Pezzey and 
Michael Toman consider the prospect raised in the second scenario— that a market economy 
could follow a path that is both optimal and unsustainable—they and most other authors devote 
most of their attention to the third scenario. 
In short, the most pressing question of scarcity and growth is, “What public action is 
required to address the New Scarcity of nonmarket environmental resources?” 
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A natural inclination—among economists, at least—is to mimic markets. If 
environmental resources are becoming scarce, government action can lead private actors to 
reflect this scarcity in their decisions by taxing emissions, setting quotas on them, or otherwise 
making markets where they did not exist before. As David Pearce shows, however, market-based 
incentives are, by and large, conspicuous by their absence. 
Why is that? In addition to the reasons Pearce offers in his chapter, we might consider 
other factors. Ramon Lopez reminds us that the institutions of the economy are subsidiary to 
those of governance more generally. We should not be surprised to identify market “failures,” 
when such failures may, in fact, represent tremendous successes for the governing elites that 
perpetuate them. David Tilman and Stephen Polasky’s work on biodiversity reveals that part of 
the problem of crafting incentives, even in an otherwise well-structured society, is complexity. 
Exactly what would we make subject to a tax or quota in order to preserve the world’s species? 
This complexity is amplified by the fact that scarcities interlock in a global society that has 
grown so large. As Christian Azar points out, we could put a sizable tax on carbon dioxide 
emissions—which could well lead farmers to plant renewable energy crops and in the process 
expand land under cultivation, reduce biodiversity, and further compound the challenges facing 
the world’s poor. Even the resolution of the Old Scarcity raises issues with regard to the New. 
David Menzie, Donald Singer, and John H. DeYoung, Jr., note that compliance with 
environmental restrictions is likely to be as important to the mining industry’s performance in 
coming years as is physical depletion. A similar message emerges from Jeffrey Krautkraemer’s 
chapter: markets seem to have been adequate to the task of allocating exhaustible natural 
resources such as oil and minerals over time. The more difficult it becomes to establish 
ownership over resources, however, the less satisfactory has been performance. Fisheries—
which are inherently more difficult to own because the fish themselves can move—are declining, 
and a host of environmental issues remain problematic, especially those being played out at a 
global scale. 
Is the answer to the New Scarcity to launch bold programs to achieve major technological 
breakthroughs? Robert Ayres finds in the historical record several major episodes in which 
radical new technologies have transformed the world through spillovers and feedback loops. He 
argues that new breakthroughs are required to achieve similar breakthroughs to overcome the 
scarcity of energy and the environmental consequences of its use. Sjak Smulders provides 
conceptual support for this notion by reviewing an influential literature that emphasizes the 
similarities between environmental and technology issues. Each may motivate public 
involvement to counteract the nonrival aspects of the goods in question. Yet Molly Macauley’s 
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chapter provides a cautionary note: the actual performance of many public programs intended to 
spur breakthroughs in environmental and resource technology has left much to be desired. As 
Macauley notes, real bureaucrats may be a good deal less efficient in achieving socially desirable 
ends than are their representations in idealized models. 
Of course, it is only to be expected that the realization of emerging scarcities and the 
evolution of policies to counter them will involve fits and starts. Although many credit private 
markets with resolving issues pertaining to the Old Scarcity of marketed natural resources, the 
history of metals, minerals, and fuels markets is replete with uncountable bankruptcies, bubbles, 
and miscalculations. We chose the phrase “evolution of policies” in the first sentence of this 
paragraph deliberately, as we mean to evoke the principles covered by Jeroen van den Bergh. If a 
thriving and, one would hope, increasingly equitable economy is to survive a brush with the 
limits of the planet’s finite carrying capacity, there must be some experimentation by which “fit” 
strategies for survival are winnowed from those that will not see us through. As Sylvie Faucheux 
points out, the criteria for fitness ought not to be limited to those factors that are easily 
incorporated in analytical models. Economists often suppose either that technology evolves 
exogenously or can be treated as an outcome of economic activity no different than any other, 
but Faucheux suggests that our long-term prospects may be determined by the complex, 
multidimensional relationship between society and its creations. 
In closing, we might consider Partha Dasgupta’s observations on the experience of 
communities around the world that lived close to nature. Survival was, for them, a matter of 
learning the limitations of their environment and living within them. It would be comforting to 
know that this is, in fact, the natural progression of mankind. Regrettably, the historical record 
suggests that it is not inevitable. There is a selection bias in that the traditional societies that 
survived to modern times are those that solved the problem of living within their ecological 
means. Societies now known only by their archaeological artifacts may not have.  
It remains an open question whether our increasingly global society can muster the 
technological, economic, and perhaps most importantly, social wherewithal to address the 
implications of the New Scarcity. We have not yet, as a race, run into the limits imposed by 
reserves of the things we regularly buy and sell. The ultimate question on which all the authors’ 
essays agree concerns whether we will be as successful in managing resources that have, to date, 
largely remained outside the realm of the market economy. Although economic prescriptions 
might be suggested for addressing the question, we suspect that the ultimate deciding factors will 
prove to involve the wisdom, compassion, and vision we can bring to our collective choices. 
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